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ON THE FRINGES OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: CHANGING REASONABLENESS
AT THE BORDER
ISABELLE HUTCHINSON
The protection of the U.S.-Mexico border has become a priority for politicians
and government officials alike. However, the protection of people s rights
near the border has been largely ignored. Due to the Fourth Amendment s
border search exception, customs officials and border patrol agents may use
lower standards for suspicion in conducting searches and seizures of people
in the border region. In determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable,
the Fourth Amendment requires balancing of the degree to which the
government intrudes on a person s privacy against the government s interest
in conducting the search. This Article analyzes the changes in enforcement at
the U.S.-Mexico border and their effect on what constitutes reasonableness
for searches and seizures in the border region. It concludes that the changes
in border and immigration enforcement enhance governmental intrusions
upon privacy while the government s interests in enforcement remain largely
unchanged. Therefore, in reevaluating reasonableness at the border, courts
would likely hold that the government s interests do not afford the degree to
which the government is intruding on privacy. While the Fourth Amendment
itself has not changed, what constitutes reasonableness at the U.S.-Mexico
border has.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined by
balancing he in i n
n a e n
i ac and he g e nmen al
interests in conducting the search or seizure. 1 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment protects against some government in i n
n e le
privacy.
Al h gh he g e nmen
methods for intrusions are always
e l ing, he e le in e e in i ac i c n an .2 In fact, courts have
held that the Fourth Amendment must progress over time in the face of
changing circumstances.3
While many cases refer solely to advances in technology affecting
government intrusions, there may be other circumstances strengthening these
intrusions. These changing circumstances may affect the Fourth
Amendmen
a lica i n ac
he U.S. Recently, however, changing
circumstances have strengthened government intrusions particularly on the
fringes, or the borders, of the nation.
The U.S. can geographically be divided into two parts: the interior
and the fringes. The interior of the country includes the area within its
1

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999)).
2
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
29 (2001).
3
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (stating that its ruling that using heat sensing
echn l g
a nc n i i nal a
ed he
e e a i n f ha deg ee f i ac again
g e nmen ha e i ed hen he F
h Amendmen a ad ed. ); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (considering the changed role of the public telephone in private
c mm nica i n de e mine a e n e ec a i n f i ac ).

SPRING 2019

THE DARTMOUTH LAW JOURNAL

37

borders. The fringes, on the other hand, consist of the U.S. borders and the
areas immediately surrounding them.
Most attention is given to the Fourth Amendment in the interior,
covering searches and seizures across the nation. Thus, the interior Fourth
Amendment provides the general rules followed by all state and local law
enforcement in conducting searches and seizures of people in the U.S.
However, the Fourth Amendment at the fringes of the nation differs
from the interior. The standards of suspicion required for conducting
reasonable searches and seizures are lower at the fringes than in the interior.
The fringes, unlike the interior, also experienced an unprecedented change
in circumstances due to heightened border and immigration enforcement,
a ic la l a he na i n S h e ern border.4
This Article discusses the changed circumstances strengthening the
g e nmen in i n
n i ac a he b de . Thi A icle
e ha
changes at the border have upset the F
h Amendmen balance be een
privacy and government interests, demanding the reevaluation of the Fourth
Amendmen
ea nablene a he f inge f he na i n.
Part II of the Article explores the current standards for the Fourth
Amendment. This section describes the central standards for lawful searches
and seizures according to the interior Fourth Amendment. It also describes
the lowered standards required for searches and seizures on the fringes of the
Fourth Amendment. Part III examines the changes caused by the increase in
border and immigration enforcement at the Southwestern border. In light of
the changes surrounding increased enforcement, this Article proposes that
courts reexamine what constitutes reasonableness at the Southwestern border.
Finall , Pa IV a g e ha he S h e e n b de
change tilt the
balancing test in favor of implementing higher standards for border searches
and seizures.
II.

CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS

The current Fourth Amendment standards describe the requirements
necessary for all officers to conduct a legal search or seizure. The interior
Fourth Amendment describes the search and seizure standards at play across
the nation. While these standards apply within the country, there are
exception to these standards on the fringes of the nation. Accordingly, the
fringes of the Fourth Amendment describe the lowered standards for
suspicion required for border-region searches and seizures.
4

Southwest Border Region, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/air-sea/operations/locations/southwest-border
(the
Southwestern border is the term used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection to describe the border
between the U.S. and Mexico).
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A. THE INTERIOR FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment commands that searches and
seizures must meet certain standards. 5 The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmations,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.6
The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure is
triggered only by government actors those people acting officially on
behalf of the government conducting government action. 7 Government
actors are limited to agents employed by the U.S. or state government. 8
The ef e, a f eign fficial ea ch f a e n ab ad d e n e i e
adherence to the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fourth Amendment still
applies to searches and seizures of U.S. citizens conducted by U.S.
government actors while the citizen is in a foreign country.
If the search and seizure is done by a government actor conducting
g e nmen ac i n, hen [ ]he threshold question . . . is whether a search or
ei e cc ed. 9 Not all actions by a government actor constitute a search
or seizure.10 Ra he , ea che cc
hen an e ec a i n f i ac ha
society is pre a ed c n ide ea nable i inf inged. 11 These include strip
searches,12 visual body cavity searches,13 and vehicle searches.14

5

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8
Samuel Crecelius, Lichtenberger and the Three Bears: Getting the Private Search Exception and
Modern Digital Storage “Just Right”, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 209, 213 (2017); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 28 (1949) (holding the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states through the
F
een h Amendmen D e P ce Cla e).
9
U.S. v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 43 (internal quotations
omitted); U.S. v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903, 908 (4th Cir. 1996).
10
Stephens, 764 F.3d at 331 (holding that not every observation made by an officer is a search);
Te
. Ohi , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ( [N] all e nal in e c
e be een licemen and
ci i en in l e ei e f e n. )
11
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (citing U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
12
See Doe v. Calument City, Ill., 754 F. Supp. 1211, 1219-20 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
13
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
14
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
6
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Seizures occur when a person is deprived dominion over his person
or property. 15 Seizures of a person occur when an officer, by means of
physical force or show of authori , e ain he e n libe in me
way.16 A ei e cc if a ea nable e n d e n feel f ee decline
he ffice
e e
he i e e mina e he enc n e . 17 Therefore,
seizures include both arrests and stops brief detentions that are short of
arrests.18
All searches and seizures must be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendmen . Wha make a ea ch and ei e ea nable de end n he
c ne
i hin hich a ea ch ake lace, 19 leading to the analysis of
he e, hen, h , h
hat, and why the search or seizure has taken
lace. 20
In determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable, the court
begin i h hi
, l king he a e and c mm n la f he f nding
era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to
e e e. 21 Then, the court must determine the reasonableness of the search
or seizure by using a balancing test. The court must balance (1) the degree
to which the search or seizure intrudes upon the pers n
i ac ; and (2) he
degree to which the search or seizure is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.22
A ei e ma in de n a e n
i ac nl if he e n had
a reasonable expectation of privacy.23 A reasonable expectation of privacy
exists if (1) an individual exhibited actual expectation of privacy; and (2) the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.24 The
e ec a i n in i ac ma change ba ed n a e n l ca i n. F e am le,
court ha e held ha a e n e ec a i n f i ac in ne e idence i
highe han in ne
ehicle.25 If a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and the government violates that expectation without a warrant or
the requisite suspicion, the government violated the Fourth Amendment.26

15

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968).
17
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 444 (1991).
18
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969); Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 19.
19
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
20
Hannah Robbins, Holding the Line: Customs and Border Protection s Expansion of the Border
Search Exception and the Ensuing Destruction of Interior Fourth Amendment Rights, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2247, 2251 (2015).
21
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008).
22
Id. at 171 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
23
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
24
Id.
25
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)
26
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
16
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If the degree to which the search or seizure is needed for the
promotion of legitimate government interests the interest the government
has in conducting the search outweighs privacy, the search or seizure is
justified as reasonable.27 C n e el , hen a e n s privacy outweighs the
legitimate government interest, the search or seizure is unreasonable, and the
Fourth Amendment is violated.
Subject to many exceptions, a search or seizure is generally
unreasonable without a warrant.28 To obtain a search or arrest warrant, an
officer must show that there is probable cause that the search or seizure is
justified. 29 The
bable ca e anda d
ec ci i en f m a h and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
c ime, hile gi ing fai lee a f enf cing he la in he c mm ni
ec i n. 30 The determination of probable cause to issue a warrant must
be reviewed by a neutral and detached member of the judiciary before the
warrant issues. 31 Accordingly, the judge must be severed from and
disengaged from the activities of law enforcement.32
To obtain an arrest warrant, probable ca e e i
he e he fac
and ci c m ance i hin [an ffice ] kn ledge and f hich [he
he]
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or
i being c mmi ed. 33 In obtaining a search warrant, probable cause exists
if, given all the circumstances set forth by the officer, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.34 The judge must make a c mm n en e deci i n ab
whether the officer demonstrated this probability.35
Probable cause is evaluated b he
ali -of-the-ci c m ance
a
ach, a e ing he
babili ie in a ic la fac al c n e . 36
P bable ca e e i e
nl a probability or substantial chance of criminal
ac i i , n a h ing f ch ac i i . 37 In determining probable cause,
he e i n i n
he he a ic la c nd c i inn cen
g il , b he
degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-c iminal ac . 38
27

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555, 561.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
29
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ( a ing ha n [ ]a an hall i e, b
n
bable ca e ).
30
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949)).
31
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
32
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
33
Safford Unified School Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (citing Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)).
34
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 230-31.
37
Id. at 243 n.13.
38
Id.
28
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Importantly, the totality of the circumstances excludes the race of
the person being searched or seized.39 Therefore, probable cause must not be
e abli hed hen he ffice
ici n i ba ed n ace.40
Probable cause instead requires individualized suspicion, which,
according to the Supreme Court, is the most important component of the
standard.41 Individualized suspicion is the idea that the states should judge
each citizen based upon his own unique actions, character, thoughts, and
situation.42
Many exceptions permit warrantless searches and seizures, such as
exigent circumstances search, search incident to arrest, and vehicle searches.
Under the exigent circumstances exception,
an officer may perform a warrantless search or seizure if both probable cause
and exigent circumstances exist. Exigent circumstances are those
ci c m ance ha ould cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or
other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of
the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
enf cemen eff . 43
Under the search incident to arrest exception, an officer may perform
a warrantless sea ch f an a e ed e n and he a ea i hin he e n
immediate control.44 A person may not be searched incident to arrest if they
were only given a citation or summons instead of being arrested.45 An officer
may conduct a search incident to arrest even if he a e
a a me e e e
46
for a search.
Under the vehicle exception, an officer may perform a warrantless
search of a vehicle. The vehicle exception was created nearly 100 years ago
in Carroll v. United States.47 The vehicle exception allows the search of a
motor vehicle without a search warrant as long as the officer has probable
cause.48 An officer may search every part of a vehicle and its contents that

39

Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1543, 1556 (2011).
40
Id. at 1587.
41
Andrew E. Taslitz, What is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits,
and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2010).
42
Id. at 146.
43
United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1987).
44
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
45
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
46
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 523 U.S. 769, 772 (2001).
47
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
48
Id. at 155-56 ( The mea e f legali
f ch ei e i . . . ha he ei ing ffice hall ha e
reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has
c n aband . . . . )
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may conceal the object of the search.49 Thi incl de he ehicle
nk and
any other containers found in the vehicle.50
Some exceptions allowing warrantless searches require only
reasonable suspicion, a standard lower than probable cause. 51 Whether
ea nable
ici n a me de end
n b h he c n en f he
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.52 In determining
if an officer had reasonable suspicion, a court takes into account he ali
of the circumstances he h le ic e. 53 The court will not consider
he he he ffice had an n a ic la i ed
ici n
h nch, b
he he he ecific ea nable infe ence hich [ he ffice ] i en i led
draw from the facts in ligh f hi e e ience. 54
Reasonable suspicion applies to traffic stops and searches such as a
and f i k. A
and f i k cc
hen an ffice
a
ec and
frisks, or pats down, the suspect to search for weapons. Under Terry, the
officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe the person is armed and
dangerous.55 The officer does not need to be certain that the individual is
armed.56 Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger.57
The overarching goal of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
e le
i ac f m g e nmen in i n . While g e nmen in i n
are allowed, the government must have a certain level of suspicion to make
an intrusion. The required level of suspicion is directly influenced by the
g e nmen
in e e in c nd c ing he ea ch
ei e. While
governmental interests may allow for reasonable intrusions, governmental
interests along the nation f inge aff d ffice minimal anda d f
suspicion in conducting reasonable searches and seizures.
B. THE FRINGES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
While the interior Fourth Amendment determines the requirements
for most searches and seizures conducted in the U.S., it is subject to many
exceptions. One major exception to the interior Fourth Amendment is the

49

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
825 (1982)).
50
Id. at 300.
51
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
52
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
53
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
54
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (internal quotations omitted).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
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border search exception. This exception lowers the standards required for a
ea ch
ei e n he na i n f inge .
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is primarily responsible
for implementing searches and seizures in these areas. CBP conducts
searches and seizures at border ports of entry where people may enter the
U.S. 58 CBP operates 328 land, air, and sea ports of entry throughout the
country.59 CBP conducts border and immigration enforcement at the border,
its functional equivalents, the 100-Mile border zone, and the sea.
1. Crossing the Border
The constraints on border patrol agents are “less stringent than
would be the case in many other contexts.”60 People entering the U.S.
through the border are subject to the Border Search Exception.61 This
exception is based on a “long-standing historically recognized exception to
the Fourth Amendment s general principle that a warrant must be
obtained.”62 Like other Fourth Amendment exceptions, the Border Search
Exception is determined by a “reasonableness” test, balancing the
government s interest against the individual s right to privacy.63 Here, the
test turns in favor of the government s interest in “national selfprotection.”64 Because border searches and seizures of persons and personal
belongings in their possession are reasonable per se, no warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion is necessary for a government official to
conduct a search or seizure at the border.65 Therefore, a person s rights at
the border are extremely limited.
While searches may be without a warrant, probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, the border search power is not unlimited.66 The border

58

At Ports of Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry.
59
Id.
60
Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 129, 134 (2010).
61
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977).
62
Id. at 621.
63
Chacón, supra note 60; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
64
Ca ll, 267 U.S. a 154 ( T a ele ma be
ed in c
ing an in e na i nal b nda
because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself
a en i led c me in, and hi bel nging a effec
hich ma be la f ll b gh in. )
65
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619; INA § 287(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c).
66
United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 945 (2005).
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search exception applies only to routine searches,67 including luggage68 and
vehicle 69 searches. Non-routine searches, however, require reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity.70 Nonroutine searches may include destructive
searches of inanimate objects, prolonged detentions, strip searches, body
cavity searches, and x-ray searches.71 For non-routine searches, the Supreme
C
ec gni ed ha [ ]he in e e in h man digni and i ac
hich
the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusion is required on the
mere chance that desired evidence migh be b ained. 72
Because the government has a high interest in national security at its
borders, the border search exception provides the government with
substantial power to intrude on personal privacy. With no warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion requirement, there are few protections for
personal privacy against routine searches.
2. The Border s Functional Equivalents
The border search exception extends to searches conducted at the
“functional equivalents” of a border.73 The border s functional equivalent is
usually the “first practical detention point after a border crossing or the
final port-of-entry.”74 Examples of searches at functionally equivalent
locations include searches at established checkpoints near the border,
searches at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend
from the border, and searches of passengers of an airplane arriving in the
U.S. after a non-stop flight departing from another country.75
A search at a functional equivalent of a border is valid when (1) a
reasonable certainty exists that the person or thing crossed the border; (2) a
reasonable certainty exists that there was no change in the object of the
search since it crossed the border; and (3) the search was conducted as soon
as practicable after the border crossing.76 This makes the border exception
apply to a geographically-fluid area because people can enter the country at
different points.77
67

Uni ed S a e . M n a de He nande , 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ( R ine ea che f he
persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable
ca e,
a an . . . . ).
68
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620.
69
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004).
70
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
71
Yule Kim, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31826, Protecting Our Perimeter: “Border Searches”
Under the Fourth Amendment 10 (2009).
72
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540-41.
73
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539 (1973).
74
Kim, supra note 71, at 7.
75
Almeida-Sanchez, 93 S.Ct. at 2539.
76
Kim, supra note 71, at 7; United States v. Hill, 939 F.2d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1991).
77
Kim, supra note 71, at 8; Hill, 939 F.2d at 936.
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P minen e am le f he b de
f nc i nal e i alen a e
interior checkpoints and airports. Because they are functionally equivalent
of the border, searches at interior checkpoints and airports require no warrant,
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.78
a. Interior Checkpoints
In 2005, U.S. Customs and Border Protection operated thirty-three
permanent traffic checkpoints at the Southwestern border. 79 Permanent
checkpoints may operate twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week.80
They may also operate even in the face of natural disasters.81 Permanent
checkpoints have infrastructure technology infrastructure, detention
facilities, paved equipment used for under-vehicle inspections, and space for
gamma-ray machines for vehicle inspections.
CBP also operates tactical checkpoints.82 Tactical checkpoints are
non-permanent and often set up with tents and traffic cones.83 The number
and l ca i n f ac ical check in change dail ba ed n a ailable
e
ce and in elligence ab
illegal en an
e . 84
At checkpoints, CBP may stop a vehicle to briefly question its
occupants.85 Checkpoint stop a e nl b ief de en i n[ ] f a ele
b
CBP d ing hich a e n m
e n[d] a b ief e i n
and
ibl . . .
d c[e] . . . a d c men e idencing a igh
be in he [U.S.]
Unlike stops under the interior Fourth Amendment, CBP may
employ race to decide whether to stop motorists or refer them to a secondary
inspection area.86 The Supreme Court held that to the extent that CBP relies
on apparent Mexican ancestry at checkpoints, that reliance is clearly relevant
to the law enforcement need to be served.87
b. Airports

78

Kim, supra note 71, at 9; Hill, 939 F.2d at 936.
U.S. GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-435, Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior
Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance 5 (2005) [hereinafter Checkpoint Data].
80
Id.
81
See Joel Rose, Border Patrol Says Checkpoints Will Remain Open During Hurricane Harvey,
NAT L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/25/546109886/border-patrolsays-checkpoints-will-remain-open-during-hurricane-harvey.
82
Checkpoint Data, supra note 79.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976).
86
Carbado & Harris, supra note 39, at 1582.
87
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 564 n.17.
79
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Because many airports provide both domestic and international
flights, different search and seizure standards can exist at adjacent boarding
gates.88 Thus, the purchase of a plane ticket may subject a person to different
Fourth Amendment rights at an airport.
Further, any airports receiving international flights are subject to the
border search exception. 89 F e am le, a ea ch f he a enge and
cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from
Me ic Ci
ld clea l be he f nc i nal e i alen f a b de ea ch. 90
3. 100-Mile Border Zone
Government officials may arrest illegal immigrants or people
committing felonies with no geographic limitation. 91 However, there is a
geographic limit for searches conducted under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. According to the INA, Government officials have the
a h i
ea ch f , and e en all ei e, illegal immig an
i hin a
reasonable distance from any external boundary of the Uni ed S a e . 92 A
reasonable distance is defined as 100 miles from the border.93 This perimeter
follows along land borders, ocean coasts, and Great Lake shores.94
This 100-mile border zone, also known as the extended border,
encompasses nearly the entire states of Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 95 It also includes the most populated
parts of California and Illinois. The border zone includes roughly 200 million
people, constituting about two-thirds of Americans.96
A government official may conduct a warrantless search in the 100mile border zone if (1) the government official has a reasonable certainty that
a border was crossed or there exists a high degree of probability that a border
was crossed; (2) the official has reasonable certainty that no change in the
object of the search occurred between the time of the border crossing and the
search; and (3) the official has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was occurring.97
88

John Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combatting International Terrorism at United
States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT L L. REV. 501, 502 (1997).
89
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
90
Id.
91
INA § 287(a)(2), (4).
92
INA § 287(a)(3).
93
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2).
94
Laila Lalami, The Border Is All Around Us, and It s Growing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/magazine/the-border-is-all-around-us-and-its-growing.html.
95
Id.
96
Id.; AM. C.L. UNION, The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone,
https://www.aclu.org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone.
97
Kim, supra note 71, at 8.
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The 100-mile border zone gives CBP a geographical limitation on
its lowered-suspicion search powers. Within this zone, the CBP may search
non-ci i en n an ail a ca , ai c af , c n e ance,
ehicle i h nl
reasonable suspicion.98 Within twenty-five miles of the border, CBP may
also enter onto private land although not dwellings without a warrant.99
This is a higher threshold level of suspicion than required at the border or its
functional equivalents.
a. Roving Patrols
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials may set up roving
patrols to supplement checkpoints within the 100-mile border zone.100 These
patrols may be operated by foot, bicycle, or vehicle and may be utilized at
bus terminals near the border. A roving patrol officer must have reasonable
suspicion that the occupant of a vehicle is undocumented before the officer
can detain and ask questions about immigration status.101
To stop a person by roving patrol, the requisite reasonable suspicion
is based on the circumstances of the person being stopped. In United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, CBP agen
ed he defendan ca ba ed n he fac
that he appeared to be Mexican.102 After questioning the passengers, agents
determined that they were illegal immigrants. 103 The defendant was then
charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. 104
The defendant moved to suppress the statements of the passengers regarding
their status because he claimed that the statements came from an illegal
seizure.105 The Supreme Court held that approving roving-patrol stops of all
vehicles in the border area with no suspicion of illegal immigrants would
subject residents within 100 miles of the border to unlimited interference
with their use of highways.106 Therefore, the Court limited the exercise of
authority granted by federal statute. The Court then held that officers on
roving patrol at the border or its functional equivalent may stop vehicles if
he a e a a e f ecific a ic lable fac , ge he i h a i nal infe ence
from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain
alien h ma be illegall in he c n . 107
98

INA § 287(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1).
INA § 287(a)(3).
100
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)).
101
United States. v. Singh, 415 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2005).
102
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 882-83.
107
Id. at 884.
99
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There are many factors that are relevant for determining reasonable
ici n f b de and immig a i n enf cemen
ing a l . Officers
ma c n ide he ehicle
imi
he b de , a ad
al affic
a e n , and he ffice
e i
e e ience i h immigrant traffic.108 The
ehicle
imi
he b de i a a am n fac
in de e mining
reasonable suspicion.109
Officers may also consider vehicle and area characteristics. Vehicles
with large compartments that could be used to transport concealed
immigrants may support reasonable suspicion.110 The officer may consider
the behavior of the driver or passenger.111 Thus, there may be reasonable
suspicion if a driver is driving erratically or evading officers.112
Unlike searches and seizures under the interior Fourth Amendment,
race may be used as a basis for suspicion. 113 An officer may recognize a
di e
a enge a earance, such as their dress and haircut that is the
cha ac e i ic a ea ance f e n h li e in Me ic . 114 Officers may
also consider the inability of the driver or passengers to speak English.115
The Brignoni-Ponce Court held that the ancestry of the person may not be
the single factor which an officer uses to justify his stop.116 H e e , [ ]he
likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high
en gh make Me ican a ea ance a ele an fac . 117
4. Sea
CBP works with the U.S. Coast Guard to enforce the border.118 The
U.S. Coast Guard is vested with virtually unlimited authority to stop, board,
and search vessels n he high ea and i hin c
m ae
i h an
particularized suspicion of wrongdoing or a warrant. 119 Customs waters
include the waters within four leagues of the coast of the U.S.120 The high
108

Id. at 884-85.
See United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1998).
110
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.
111
Id. at 884.
112
Id. at 885.
113
Carbado & Harris, supra note 39, at 1578.
114
Id.
115
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975).
116
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86.
117
Id. at 886.
118
See Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard Seize 368 Rounds of Ammo Bound for
Guatemala,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
&
BORDER
PROTECTION
(Sept.
13,
2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/customs-and-border-protection-coast-guardseize-368-rounds-ammo-bound.
119
Megan Jaye Kight, Constitutional Barriers to Smooth Sailing: 14 U.S.C. § 89(A) and the Fourth
Amendment, 72 IND. L. J. 571, 571-572 (1997); 14 U.S.C.A. § 89(a) (2010); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)
(2017).
120
19 U.S.C.A. § 1401(j) (2017).
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seas are the areas outside of customs waters.121 The Coast Guard may stop
and board vessels in customs waters and the high seas for the purposes of
e en i n, de ec i n, and
ression of violations of the laws of the
U.S. 122
The Coast Guard may also conduct border stops. A seizure in high
seas may be considered a border search if the seizure occurs at a United
States port of entry.123 A border search may also occur when an officer has
ea nable ce ain
articulable facts supporting a reasonably certain
conclusion that the vessel sailed from international waters into U.S.
territory.124
The reasonable certainty requirement is not clearly defined. 125
However, the Supreme Court noted ha ea nable ce ain . . . i clea l
a higher standard than tha f
bable ca e. 126 This higher standard
e i e ha he ali
f he ci c m ance [al ng] i h he ffice
knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information be
sufficient in the light of their experience to warrant a firm belief that a border
c
ing cc ed.
When an officer stops someone in territorial waters and bases his
decision on ethnicity alone, he does not have reasonable certainty that the
vessel came from international waters. 127 Because the reasonable certainty
anda d i n me , he agen
ea ch
ei e i n
bjec
he b de
exception, which implements lower Fourth Amendment standards. 128
III. CHANGING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE BORDER REGION
U.S. Customs and Border Protection covers three border regions:
the Coastal border, Northern border, and Southwestern border.129 While the
Fourth Amendment standards at each border are the same, the enforcement
reality between them is very different. Because the overwhelming amount

121

19 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2017).
14 U.S.C.A. § 89(a) (2017).
123
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589-92 (1983); see At Ports of Entry, supra
note 58.
124
United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976).
125
Id.
126
Id. (citing United States v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1974)).
127
Sanchez v. Sessions, 870 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2017).
128
Id.
129
Sector Profile - Fiscal Year 2017, UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL (2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017Dec/USBP%20Stats%20FY2017%20sector%20profile.pdf.
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of CBP power and money is used near the Southwestern border, this article
focuses primarily on the Southwestern border.
The Southwestern border spans more than 2,000 miles of
international border with Mexico, encompassing Texas, Arizona, New
Mexico, and southern California.130 The Southwestern border operation is by
far, the largest of the sectors. It accounts for over 85% of the total agents
staffed and 97% of the total apprehensions of illegal aliens made.131
The Southwestern border uses multiple methods to prevent illegal
immigration. CBP supports ICE and local law enforcement with its Air
branches by using helicopters to interdict those illegally entering the
country.132 CPB also uses its Marine branches to combat illegal immigration
by sea.133
The Southwestern border contains 705 miles of fencing between the
U.S. and Mexico.134 CBP conducts surveillance using en
inc ea e
situational awareness of activity in areas that are difficult to persistently
a l. 135 It also operates 33 permanent checkpoints and up to 182 nonpermanent checkpoints on the Southwestern border.136
The Southwestern border demonstrates the transformation in border and
immigration enforcement. Through increased militarization of the border,
use of invasive technology, and increased cooperation with local law
enf cemen and ICE, CBP ha inc ea ed i in i n
n e le
i ac
near the Southwestern border.
A. INCREASED MILITARIZATION OF THE BORDER
Mili a i a i n cc
hen he e i enhanced border policing with
the specific aim of highlighting the use of military rhetoric and ideology, as
well as military tactics, a eg , echn l g , e i men and f ce . . . . 137
130

Fact Sheet: Southwest Border Region, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (2013),
https://nemo.cbp.gov/air_marine/FS_Southwest_Border_Region.pdf; Southwest Border Region,
supra note 4.
131
Sector Profile - Fiscal Year 2017, UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL (2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017132
Southwest Border Region, supra note 4.
133
Id.
134
Mileage of Pedestrian and Vehicle Fencing by State, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION
(2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017Sep/Border%20Patrol%20Fence%20Totals.pdf.
135
CBP s Border Security Efforts: An Analysis of Southwest Border Security Between the Ports of
Entry
5,
DEP T
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/OIG-17-39-Feb17.pdf.
136
Id. at 6.
137
Jeremy Slack et al., The Geography of Border Militarization: Violence, Death and Health in
Mexico and the United States, 15 J. OF LATIN AM. GEOGRAPHY 7, 9 (2016) (internal quotations
omitted).
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This, in turn, conflicts with the human rights of border crossers and
residents.138 Recently, funding to enforce the Southwestern border has grown
rapidly. 139 For example, funding for the Secure the Border Initiative an
effort to reduce illegal immigration increased from $38 million in 2005 to
$800 million in 2010.140
CBP also expanded its staff significantly in the past thirty years.141
CBP increased its numbers from 5,000 agents in 1992 to almost 20,000 as of
2016.142 The T m admini a i n h e
c n in e CBP e an i n
increase the enforcement of immigration laws. 143 According to Former
A ne Gene al Jeff Se i n , Thi i a ne e a [f immig a i n
enf cemen ]. Thi i he T m E a. 144
Militarization is actually linked to the increase in deaths at the
border.145 Scholars have noted that border crossing was lethal prior to the
1990s.146 However, due to drastic enforcement changes, most deaths were
concentrated to the southern Arizona region. 147 Since the early 2000s,
immigrant deaths have increased exponentially, especially in Arizona and
Texas.148 The trend of immigrant border deaths continues to move upwards
despite the reduction in border apprehensions.149
Politicians and government officials alike have used military
rhetoric and ideology to describe the border. Politicians have reinforced
militarization at the border by recognizing he Wa n D g , 150 he Wa

138

Id.
Id. at 10.
140
Id.; The Rise and Fall of the Secure Border Initiative s High-Tech Solution to Unauthorized
Immigration,
AM.
IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL
(Apr.
15,
2010),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/rise-and-fall-secure-borderinitiative%E2%80%99s-high-tech-solution-unauthorized-immigration.
141
Christine Stenglein, Struggling to hang on to 20K officers, Border Patrol looks to hire 5K more,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 7, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/07/07/strugglingto-hang-on-to-20k-officers-border-patrol-looks-to-hire-5k-more/.
142
Ted Hesson, Sessions signals immigration crackdown: ‘This is the Trump era , POLITICO (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/jeff-sessions-immigration-crackdown-237109.
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Id.
144
Id.
145
Slack et al., supra note 137, at 10.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 11.
150
Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide says Nixon s war on drugs targeted blacks, hippies, CNN (Mar.
24, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixon-drug-warblacks-hippie/index.html.
139

52

THE DARTMOUTH LAW JOURNAL

VOL. XVII:1

n Te , 151 and he Wa n he B de . 152 CBP officials frequently
evoke images of terrorists and foreign threats materializing at the
Southwestern Border.153 In fac , CBP mi i n f c e n
ec ing he
154
public from danger
e le and ma e ial . . . .
The agency believes
and a i e
ec he Ame ican e le again e i
and he
inst men f e . 155
CBP has further militarized the Southwestern border by hiring
former military members and employing military equipment. 156 As
em l ee , f me mili a membe
an f med he CBP
gani a i nal
157
culture to that of the military branches. While military forces are trained
to engage enemy combatants, this approach fails on border because
undocumented immigrants are not enemy combatants.158
Militarization was also enforced due to the rearrangement of CBP.159
The dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Services, the
organization which formerly encompassed CBP, led to a drastic change in
border security strategy. 160 CBP implemented the Consequence Delivery
System (CDS) in 2011. 161 CDS incl ded ac ice
hich e cala e[d]
punishments for undocumented migrants apprehended along the
[S h e e n] b de and la [ed] a ke
le in he h le f g e nmen
approach that involves all levels of law enforcement across several agencies
in immig a i n enf cemen . 162
In implementing CDS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
employed actions on apprehended immigrants, including (1) repatriation to
Southwestern border locations far from where the immigrant was
apprehended; (2) formal removal orders carrying bars on future admission to
the U.S.; (3) notices to appear before immigration judges with the possibility
f he immig an
em al f m he U.S.; and (4)
ec i n f r federal
immigration crimes carrying sentences of months and even years.163 CDS led
151

Nicholas Schmidle, Trump s Pentagon Tries to Move on From the War on Terror, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-pentagon-tries-to-move-onfrom-the-war-on-terror.
152
Todd Miller, War on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-the-border.html.
153
Slack et al., supra note 138, at 12.
154
About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.cbp.gov/about.
155
Id.
156
Slack et al., supra note 137, at 11.
157
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 12.
160
Id.
161
Randy Capps et al., Advances in U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement: A Review of the
Consequence Delivery System 1 (May 2017).
162
Slack et al., supra note 137, at 12.
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Capps et al., supra note 161, at 1.
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local law enforcement and other officials to act as immigration authorities,
detaining people for alleged immigration offenses. 164 This also led to
increased incarceration rates and lengths of sentences for immigration
offenders.165
There also exists a decline in immigrants prevailing on their cases
for legal status.166 Only 16,058 people prevailed in their immigration cases
from February 1 to July 31, 2017, allowing them to stay in the U.S.167 This
marks a 20.7 percent decline from the same time period in 2016.168
The increase in orders for removal and decrease in prevailing on
immigration cases could be due to the changes in priority deportation. Under
the Obama administration, only 13 e cen f he e ima ed 11 milli n
unauthorized immigrants were considered a priority for deportation because
of a disqualifying criminal conviction, recent removal order, or recent illegal
entry . . . . 169 President Trump expanded the pool dramatically with his
executive order on interior enforcement. 170 T m
E ec i e O de
Enhancing P blic Safe in he In e i
f he Uni ed S a e defied
enforcement priorities and placed all unauthorized individuals and even
some authorized individuals171 at risk of deportation, including families,
long-time residents, and Dreamers, people brought to the U.S. as children.172
These trends ha e f ndamen all
e ha ed h
mig an
experience the border, as well as conveniently framed an ever-expanding
maj i a c iminal alien d e
he change in
ec i n [ f
mig an ] . . . . 173 The increase of enforcement tactics and addition of
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Slack et al., supra note 137, at 12.
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Maria Sacchetti, Deportation orders increase under Trump; fewer migrants prevail in court,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ctdeportation-orders-trump-20170808-story.html.
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Id.
169
Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, The Trump Administration at Six Months: A Sea Change in
Immigration
Enforcement,
MIGRATION
POL Y
INST.
(July
19,
2017),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-administration-six-months-sea-changeimmigration-enforcement.
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Id.
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See Masha Gessen, In America, Naturalized Citizens No Longer Have an Assumption of
Permanence, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/inamerica-naturalized-citizens-no-longer-have-an-assumption-of-permanence.
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Exec. Order. No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 2017-02102 (2017). For a summary of the executive
order, see Summary of Executive Order “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United
States”,
AM.
IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL
(May
19,
2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/immigration-interior-enforcement-executive-order.
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Slack et al., supra note 137, at 12.
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military rhetoric enforce the militarization of the Southwestern border. 174
The f eling f CBP b dge b he g e nmen nl add f el to this flame.
B. INVASIVE TECHNOLOGY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses technology to supplement
its forces and respond to the changing threat environment. 175 CBP
technological advances have changed the way it screens incoming people
and cargo and secures the border. 176 Unsurprisingly, the Department of
Homeland Security continued to increase its funding of border technology.177
In fact, estimates say that spending on global border control and biometrics
will double to $16.5 billion in 2012 to $32.5 billion by 2021.178
The agency is using technology to reduce wait times for travelers.179
CBP incorporates biometrics into passports which makes inspections more
efficient and accurate.180 The agency also uses Automated Passport Control
kiosks and the Mobile Passport Control smartphone app to quickly accept
travelers. 181 CBP a ma ed ca g
ce ing ed ce
ai ime a
well.182
CBP continues to use cameras to facilitate its operations, including
officer body-worn cameras, fixed-tower cameras, and remote and mobile
surveillance systems.183 Its Remote Video Surveillance Systems are already
in use in Texas and Arizona. 184 RVSS employs day and night cameras,
loudspeakers, and floodlights. 185 They also have motion and seismic
detectors which may trigger alerts to CBP.186 Air and Marine Operations use

174

Id. at 11-12.
R. Gil Kerlikowske, Technology: Force Multiplier and Facilitation Tool, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (May 31, 2016),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/blogs/technology-force-multiplier-and-facilitation-tool.
176
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See Budget-in-Brief: Fiscal Year 2016 38, DEP T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf (raising
the budget from $351 million in 2014 to $373.5 million in 2016).
178
Exclusive – Q&A with Immigration, Border Management Expert on Security, Tech Market,
HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.hstoday.us/channels/global/exclusiveq-a-with-immigration-border-management-expert-on-security-tech-market/.
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https://www.govtechworks.com/technology-is-border-patrols-highest-need/#gs.QtPiOZc.
185
Id.
186
Id.
175

SPRING 2019

THE DARTMOUTH LAW JOURNAL

55

drones and aircrafts to capture full-motion video to detect issues at the border
through video and audio.187
The f
e f CBP b de ec i echn l g i h n ann all a he
Border Security Expo where DHS officials can browse booths with the
la e in en i n
e and
ec he Uni ed S a e b de . 188
C. INCREASED COOPERATION WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ICE
While the federal government is responsible for enforcing the civil
provisions of immigration laws, state and local law enforcement support the
federal government by enforcing the criminal provisions of immigration
laws. 189 Most jurisdictions also permit police officers to question people
about their immigration status during criminal matters, such as traffic
stops.190
Additionally, local authorities may be permitted to take on the
fede al g e nmen
le in immig a i n enf cemen .191 Section 287(g) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act permits DHS to enter into agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies to allow them to enforce
federal immigration law in jails or in the course of their regular work.192
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the
in e iga i e a m f he De a men f H meland Sec i , al
k
193
with state and local law enforcement. ICE offers state and local law
enforcement technological access to multiple federal databases which
includes criminal and civil immigration information.194 ICE may also use
ae di e
licen e da aba e
l ca e immig an f enf cemen
187
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purposes.195 Additi nall , [j]ail a h i ie gi e ICE agen acce
jail
and lists of arrestees, enabling the agency to target individuals for
de
a i n. 196
Some states have taken border patrol into their own hand. Texas, for
example, formed its own police force to patrol the Southwestern border,
supplementing CBP.197 The Texas border police force deploys boats on the
Rio Grande, helicopters in the air, and hundreds of black-and-white patrol
cars on South Texas highways.198 According to Rio Grande Valley residents,
the additional troopers have turned the area into a police state.199
IV.

RETHINKING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS IN THE
BORDER REGION

Courts determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure by
balancing the degree to which the search or seizure intrudes upon the
e n
i ac and he deg ee
hich he ea ch i needed f
he
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 200 While this test has
determined reasonableness for years, the test should be reevaluated due to
the changes presented by the breadth of border and immigration enforcement.
Although the government maintains its legitimate interest in border
and immigration enforcement, changes at the Southwestern border have
inc ea ed he g e nmen
in i n n i ac . While ea ches and
seizures at the border are reasonable per se, searches and seizures within the
border should be reevaluated. Therefore, the increase in border and
immigration enforcement measures begs for a reevaluation of
reasonableness at the Southwestern border.
The main source of change in the reasonableness balancing test
comes from the increased government intrusion on privacy. The degree to
which the search is needed for the promotion of legitimate government
interests is largely unchanged at the border but should include the broader
interest in reducing violations of the Fourth Amendment.
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A. REWEIGHING PRIVACY
In determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable, courts must
c n ide he in i n
na e n
i ac . C
m
c n ide he
current state of the intrusion, including any changes affecting the scope of
the intrusion. At the Southwestern border, three major changes created a
g ea e in i n
n i ac : he b de mili a i a i n, ad ancemen f
technology, and cooperation with state and local law enforcement.
Addi i nall , CBP ffice
e f f ce dem n a e he in i n
n he
privacy right for personal security.
1. Effects of Militarization
The b de mili a i a i n inc ea ed he deg ee f he g e nmen
intrusion upon privacy. The government engages in an unjustifiable intrusion
n i ac
hene e he m ni ing f i ci i en e l in he ab e f
i
e . 201 This abuse may come from the creation of feeling constantly
monitored by the government.202
Residents of border towns face constant monitoring by CBP. 203
While these citizens do not fear undocumented immigrants, they do fear
CBP.204 They feel that CBP is threatening.205 One border resident told the
Ne Y k Time ha he e i fea [ f CBP] e e
he e. 206 Reports of
heavy-handedness by border agents have bred mistrust among border
residents.207 The fea
f he c mm ni a e c m nded b he fac ha
many families live in mixed-status households, where some members are
living in the country legally and others aren , c ea ing a fea
f
e a a i n. 208 This sense of paranoia due to being monitored was caused by
he c hing e ence f CBP and i mili a i a i n. CBP a an ia-causing
presence demonstrates its abuse of power. This abuse of power causes
increased intr i n in b de e iden
i ac .
201

Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1539, 1545 (2014).
202
Id.
203
Shikha Dalmia, How America turned this Arizona town into a police state, THE WEEK (Aug. 29,
2017), http://theweek.com/articles/719688/how-america-turned-arizona-border-town-into-policestate.
204
Id.
205
Mariano Castillo, For those living on border, security is complicated subject, CNN (July 21,
2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/21/us/immigration-border-security/index.html.
206
John M. Broder, Immigration Raids, Far From Border, Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/us/immigration-raids-far-from-border-drawcriticism.html.
207
Castillo, supra note 205.
208
Id.
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Furthermore, towns on the border are often isolated.209 Some towns
require travelers to go through permanent checkpoints to enter or exit the
area.210 Some border residents feel targeted and profiled by CBP.211 They
also feel like the national rhetoric was racially discriminatory.212
2. Effects of Technology
With the growth of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, there are
more officers targeting immigrants. Because there is an exponential increase
in the number of officers and checkpoints, there are more opportunities
he e he g e nmen ma in de
n a e n privacy with little to no
ici n f
ngd ing. CBP echn l gical ad ance e nen ia e i
abili
in de n a e n
i ac .
Im
emen in CBP ideo surveillance, for example, further its
in i n in
i ac . CBP d ne
eillance may provide persistent
examination. 213 There is not yet law regarding privacy against drones.
However, technological advances will permit the government to push the
boundaries of privacy. This assembling of data from surveillance of the
border area reveals private aspects of personal identity and is susceptible to
abuse.214
The CBP echn l g and i e i f eled b i inc ea ing b dge .
Because its budget continues to expand causes a greater invasion of privacy,
CBP in i n
n i ac c n in e
g
.
3. Effects of Cooperation
Additionally, due to its cooperation with state and local law
enforcement, CBP increased its manpower and ability to detain and deport
immigrants, sometimes wrongfully so. 215 While CBP c e a i n i h
state and local law enforcement makes targeting immigrants easier, the
cooperation leads to confusion in applying Fourth Amendment rules.
209

Manny Fernandez, Checkpoints Isolate Many Immigrants in Texas Rio Grande Valley, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/us/checkpoints-isolate-manyimmigrants-in-texas-rio-grande-valley.html.
210
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211
Leif Reigstad, Crossing the Line in El Cenizo, TEX. MONTHLY (Aug. 2017),
https://features.texasmonthly.com/editorial/crossing-line-el-cenizo/.
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Id.
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Drones and privacy: A looming threat, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/03/drones-and-privacy.
214
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (discussing the invasion of privacy caused
by GPS tracking).
215
See Joel Rubin & Paige St. John, How a U.S. citizen was mistakenly targeted for deportation.
He s not alone, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017, 7:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meice-citizen-arrest-20171129-story.html.
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For example, both CBP agents and police officers must have
reasonable suspicion to stop a car. Officers may not selectively enforce the
law based on the consideration of race.216 However, CBP agents may rely on
indicators of origin to conduct stops for border and immigration enforcement.
Because CBP agents, unlike officers, may base their suspicion on indicators
f igin, CBP
anda d a e ea ie to attain.
U ing indica
f igin ignifican l inc ea ed CBP in i n
into privacy. Because agents may use roving patrols to make stops essentially
without suspicion, the privacy rights of immigrants near the border are
minute. Although roving patrols legally require reasonable suspicion, the
factors to achieve this standard are inconclusive. By achieving reasonable
suspicion through stereotypical characteristics of immigrants, including a
e n hai c , d e , inabili
eak Engli h, CBP can get away with
searches and seizures of immigrants without any suspicion.
These lower standards intrude upon privacy at particularly high rates
in areas with large populations of minority groups. The Southwestern border,
in particular, has the largest concentration of Hispanic population. 217 In
Texas, for instance, 39.1% of people are of Hispanic or Latino descent,
compared to 42.6% of people who are white.218 Because the 100-mile border
zone covers the most Hispanic-dense areas of the U.S. and includes several
major metropolitan areas, the privacy of a vast number of people is intruded
upon by CPB.
Although CBP is authorized to use racial identifiers in reaching its
ea nable
ici n anda d, hi anda d in en ifie he g e nmen
intrusion upon the privacy of people, particularly non-citizens and citizens
f f eign de cen . The ef e, he g e nmen in i n
n i ac ha
increased at the Southwestern border.
4. Effects of Force
People also have a privacy right in regard to their personal
security.219 The Fourth Amendment itself gives a person the right to

216

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Anna Brown & Mark Hugo Lopez, Mapping the Latino Population, By State, County and City,
PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/08/29/mapping-the-latinopopulation-by-state-county-and-city/.
218
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CENSUS
BUREAU
(2016),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/TX/RHI825216#viewtop.
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See Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of the
Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 895-96 (2004) (stating
that the Fourth Amendment recognizes the value of privacy in its guarding of security of houses,
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privacy over his or her body.220 However, an officer may use force against
a person to conduct a search or seizure. 221
An ffice
e f f ce m be ea nable.222 Whe he an ffice
use of force is reasonable requires the same Fourth Amendment balance of
the intrusion of the individual against the countervailing government
interests.223 Anytime an officer conducts a search or seizure, there is risk of
physical harm to the person being searched or seized. Additionally, an officer
conducts a seizure when he intentionally shoots a person he is trying to
arrest.224
U.S. C
m and B de P ec i n agen
se of force led to many
deaths at the border. Between 2010 and 2016, at least fifty-three individuals
died due to encounters with U.S. Customs and Border Protection.225 At least
48 of these deaths resulted from the use of force or coercion. 226 At least
nineteen of the individuals who died between 2010 and 2016 were U.S.
citizens. 227 There were also six people killed by CBP while on Mexican
soil.228 Notably, CBP-caused deaths along the Southwestern border grossly
outnumbered those in other border areas. 229 The Southwestern border
experienced forty-four deaths, while the remaining areas experienced only
seven deaths.230 In addition, at least twenty-six individuals were seriously
injured while encountering CBP.231
CBP
e f f ce, e eciall a he S h e e n b de , ovides
the public with a higher degree of privacy interest. Because CBP uses force
at the border regardless of whether the person is on U.S. soil or is a U.S.
ci i en, CBP
e f f ce, sometimes fatal, is unreasonable.
Although the government maintains its interest in protecting the
border, it cannot logically say that this interest is maintained by murdering
people who are outside of the country or who are citizens of this country. In
fact, the Fourth Amendment protects those outside of the U.S. against an

220
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222
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ffice
n ea nable e f deadl f ce.232 Therefore, there is an increased
privacy interest in the personal security in the border area.
Courts must consider changes in circumstances that affect intrusions
n a e n
i ac . A he S h e e n b de , he CBP
militarization, advancement of technology, use of excessive force, and
cooperation with local, state and federal law enforcement further intrude
upon privacy. The use of force by CBP officers additionally demonstrates
the intrusion upon the privacy a person has in their security. Therefore, the
courts must examine these intrusions when determining the reasonability of
searches and seizures in the Southwestern border region.
B. A BROADER VIEW OF GOVERNMENT INTEREST
The e le
igh
privacy is balanced with the legitimate
g e nmen al in e e . While CBP
ima legi ima e g e nmen in e e
is enforcing the border to deter illegal immigration and smuggling, the
government has many legitimate interests like cost effectively solving and
prosecuting crime -- hich affec he g e nmen deci i n c nd c a
search or seizure.233 234
Like i e, he g e nmen in e e in l ing, and prosecuting
crime and saving money should be considered in the border areas which
require lowered suspicion standards for conducting lawful searches and
seizures. Because these government interests could be served by the
reduction in Fourth Amendment violations, the court should also consider
the reduction of illegal searches and seizures as a broader government
interest.
The government has an interest in solving and prosecuting crimes.235
To prosecute a crime, the government must use evidence to establish the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 236 However, not all
evidence is admissible. 237 When a government actor illegally conducts a
search and seizure, the exclusionary rule applies, and the evidence obtained
as a result of the violation is inadmissible in court.238 The exclusionary rule,
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Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 729-30 (9th Cir. 2018).
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thus, serves to preserve judicial integrity and to deter illegal police
activity.239
Because CBP uses local and state police to conduct immigration
enf cemen , he i k f b aining e idence illegall i highe . CBP mix of
federal, state, and local law enforcement creates confusion between the
standards that are required to conduct a legal search or seizure. Additionally,
the factors used to reach the requisite level of suspicion differ between the
forces.
Because a state or local officer has a greater chance of confusing
legal standards and conducting an illegal search, the chance for excluding
e idence i highe . The g e nmen in e e in l ing and
ec ing
crime is, therefore, promoted by decreasing illegal searches.
The government also has an interest in saving money.240 One way
for the government to maintain this interest is to avoid liability for the illegal
acts of its officers.
A e n ma
e an ffice , lice de a men , j i dic i n f
injuries ca ed b an ffice
ngd ing. 241 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
person may sue a city for constitutional violations committed by the
police.242 Damage a a ded nde 1983 c m en a e e n f inj ie
ha a e ca ed b he de i a i n f c n i i nal igh . 243 Plaintiffs may
receive damages reflecting the harm they endured due to the police
misconduct, including compensatory and general damages.244
The Supreme Court has upheld awards of general damages for
unlawful searches and seizures on multiple occasions.245 General damages
awarded have resulted from physical harm like pain, disability, and
discomfort, and emotional and mental harm like fear, humiliation, and
mental anguish.246 General damages include loss of bodily integrity, loss of
dignity, violation of personhood, loss of freedom, damage to reputation, and
loss of privacy.247 These costs vary depending on the person being searched.
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Historically persecuted groups, for instance, are likely to experience
especially high costs.248
Compensatory damages awarded under § 1983 include loss of past
earnings, impairment of future earnings, property damage expenses, and
medical treatment expenses.249 Plaintiffs who succeed in their § 1983 claims
a e f en a a ded milli n-dollar compensation awards for physical injuries,
pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost wages.250
Due to the windfall amounts awarded to plaintiffs under § 1983, the
government has an interest in saving money by avoiding liability. The
government risks liability by committing illegal searches and seizures. Thus,
he g e nmen in e e in a ing m ne i e ed b abiding b he F
h
Amendment.
While CBP
ima
in e e i in border and immigration
enforcement, the government also has an interest in solving and prosecuting
crime and saving money. Beca e he g e nmen in e e in l ing and
prosecuting crime and saving money are served by the reduction of Fourth
Amendment i la i n , he c
h ld c n ide he g e nmen b ade
interests in reducing illegal searches or seizures. Therefore, when balancing
he g e nmen in e e
i h i in i n
n i ac , he c
hould
c n ide he g e nmen
in e e
in both border and immigration
enforcement and the reduction of illegal searches and seizures.
B de and immig a i n enf cemen a e CBP
ima
bjec i e
behind its conduct at the Southwestern border. This interest remains
relatively constant. Therefo e, c
c n ide a i n f a b ade ie
f
governmental interests would not likely have an overwhelming impact on
he eigh f he g e nmen in e e
hen balanced again he in i n
on privacy. However, the analysis could provide additional clarity into how
the government could best serve its interests.
V.
248

CONCLUSION
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250
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854 (4th Cir. 2001) (permitting compensatory damages of $300,000 for past and future medical
costs from injuries caused by excessive use of force during arrest); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Soto,
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The F
h Amendmen
ea nablene i de e mined b he
balance be een he in i n
na e n
i ac and he g e nmen al
interests in conducting it. This balance may tilt one way when there are
changes in circumstances regarding searches and seizures. Although the
Fourth Amendment itself does not change, what constitutes reasonableness
may be subject to reevaluation.
The Bo de Sea ch E ce i n balanced he g e nmen
high
interest in border regulation against high intrusions into personal privacy.
While this balance may still exist at border crossings, the intrusion by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection within the border has increased substantially.
Therefore, courts should reconsider the balancing of the intrusion upon
privacy versus the go e nmen in e e in ligh f he change a he
Southwestern border.
D e
he S h e e n b de
inc ea ed mili a i a i n,
technology, and cooperation with local and state law enforcement with ICE,
he g e nmen in i n ha ai ed i hin he egion. First, U.S. Customs
and B de P ec i n mili a i a i n c ea ed an nj ifiable in i n
n
privacy by its heavy monitoring of the border region and its people. Second,
he agenc
inc ea e in echn l g am lified
eillance, inc ea ing he
g e nmen in i n
n i ac . Thi d, he g e nmen abili
e
racial identifiers to target minorities, particularly Hispanics, increases its
in i n
n e le
i ac . Addi i nall , g e nmen in i n
occurred at the Southwestern border as a result of numerous invasions of
personal security.
The in i n f i ac m
be balanced i h he g e nmen
interests in conducting the search or seizure. At the Southwestern border, the
government has an interest in immigration and border enforcement. The
government also has an interest in solving and prosecuting crime and saving
money. Because these interests may be served by reducing illegal searches
and seizures, preventing Fourth Amendment violations should also be
included in the cou
c n ide a i n f g e nmen in e e .
If courts balanced the S h e e n b de
i ac in i n
again
he g e nmen
interest, they would likely hold that the
g e nmen in e e d n aff d he deg ee
hich CBP i in ding
on privacy. While the Fourth Amendment, itself, has not changed, what
constitutes reasonableness at the Southwestern border has.

